WHY BONIFACIO WAS CALLED THE FATHER OF THE REVOLUTION
by Maria Cielito Reyno

      On the night of 7 July 1892, a group of men gathered on Azcarraga Street in Manila to organize a secret society whose aim was to wrest, through armed means, the freedom of the Filipinos from the hands of their oppressors.  Earlier that day the repressive colonial government announced the banishment to Dapitan, of the Filipinos’ foremost campaigner for reforms- Jose Rizal.  To the other campaigners, this setback was but the final nail hammered in the casket of reformist struggle which had been carried out by the Propaganda leaders Rizal, Del Pilar, Lopez Jaena and Ponce.  Four days earlier Rizal had made one last effort for the reformist campaign by organizing the La Liga Filipina, whose ultimate aim was the equalization of rights between Filipino natives and the Spaniards.  Among those who joined Rizal at the La Liga founding was one named Andres Bonifacio, a warehouseman in a foreign-owned firm, a man who lacked the educational attainment or intellectual brilliance of his fellow La Liga organizers but more than made up for it with his driven desire to take part in the campaign to change Philippine society.  But while he joined Rizal in his reformist quest, Rizal whom he had idolized from afar, whose works he had read with a passion and whose teachings he took to heart and tried to live by, Bonifacio knew—knowledge borne by lifelong deprivation– that peaceful struggle and its aim of genuine Philippine assimilation into Spanish society had become untenable.  And Rizal’s banishment on July 7 only confirmed that the eleventh hour had arrived: the goal of assimilation had given way to separation; peaceful ways had given way to armed struggle.  Thus on the night of July 7 1892, Bonifacio along with five other kindred souls gathered to organize the Kataastaasang Kagalanggalang na Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan –the Highest and Most Respectable Society of the Sons of the People- eventually known simply as the Katipunan, its aim- Philippine independence; its means- revolution.

       Seemingly from out of nowhere Bonifacio appeared on the scene of the struggle for change in Philippine society led by the Propagandists.  He was not of their league for he had attained an education that today according to one historian would be equivalent to only fourth grade.  He joined freemasonry and through it learned of the ideals of equality, brotherhood and liberty among men regardless of color, education or creed.  Among his fellow masons was Deodato Arellano who was his housemate.  Through Arellano he met the latter’s brother-in-law Marcelo del Pilar, stalwart of the Progaganda.  Through the movement he got exposed to La Solidaridad, its mouthpiece, where he read the articles of Jaena, del Pilar, and Rizal.  Thus when Rizal made the call to join a formal organization that would finally bring about change in society, Bonifacio was among those who heeded the call.

       But who would have thought that a man who was not equal to his comrades in terms of wealth, education or old-world sophistication was the man who would take the struggle for social change and was inspired by the love of his fellow Filipino to a higher level.  Bonifacio saw what the others did not see, refused to acknowledge or were resigned to a pervasive sense of despair: that a new world of freedom, where justice, compassion and a meaningful life reigned- was possible.  And that the Filipino despite his ignorance, his destitution, his utter lack of resources- was capable of creating that world with his own hands, with no need of leaders- only courage and hope for a better future that are borne of self-sacrifice and confidence in his fellow Filipino.

        As the reformist movement died out, with its leaders either dying, giving up, arrested or banished, Bonifacio took his nation’s future into his own hands and made his fellow Filipinos see that freedom from hunger, poverty, and injustice was a reality that was not beyond their grasp.  By organizing the Katipunan, he infected them with this vision and thereby planted the seeds of the Revolution.  Despite del Pilar’s last-minute conversion from reformist to revolutionist, or the refusal of the Mabini and other Liga members to join him in the Katipunan, he went ahead and followed his dream.

 And so the Katipunan spread out from Manila to its suburbs and other provinces in Luzon, as far north as the Ilocos region and south as Bicol, and reaching even Panay in the Visayas.  In 1896, four years after organizing the Katipunan, despite Rizal’s warning that it was foolish to launch a revolution without arms or the support of the wealthy, Bonifacio went ahead and issued the call to begin the revolution.  For, the Father of the Revolutiong and the Filipinos knew they had nothing to lose but their shackles.

REFORMING THE AFP MAGSAYSAY’S
Foundation Theory in Neutralizing Insurgency
by Peter Jaynul Villanueva Uckung

        The Philippine government never faced a more dangerous era of insurgency than the late 1940’s.

        The rebels, led by the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB), had been attacking government targets with impunity and gaining more adherents as the government encountered failure after failure in their drive to combat the HMB. Town halls were occupied by rebels. They set ?re to a Philippine Constabulary camp in Tarlac (Camp Makabulos).

       In 1948, when Ramon Magsaysay (then still a congressman) was appointed chairman of the committee of National Defense, defeatism hounded the ranks of the military. Defense Secretary Ruperto Kangleon, a former guerrilla (like Magsaysay), put the blame on the military itself, which was plagued with dissension and demoralization.

       Defective policies and internal regulations discouraged professionalism and generated contempt, divisiveness, and graft in the Armed Forces of the Philippines. It was ideologically divided into a group composed of old of?cers (who were mostly regulars even before World War II), and a group composed mainly of ex-guerrillas. There was a thinly disguised culture of favoritism in promotion.

       To make matters worse, the Military Police Command (the military unit assigned to combat the Huks) committed abuses among the people in its operations against the rebels.

      A prompt salvation of the AFP was due if it was to save the government from being overthrown by the Huks. Magsaysay worked out a list of remedial legislations designed to introduce reforms in the AFP. Some of these reforms were: the Personnel Act of 1948 which was about AFP appointments, promotions and retirements; Adjustment of Ranks Act; Integration Bill to include reserve of?cers into the new AFP master roster; and a bill to grant permanent ranks to guerrillas, veterans, and civilian volunteers with meritorious records.

       When Magsaysay became secretary of National Defense, his effort to reform the AFP kicked into high gear. This time, he had the chance to get personal with the soldiers. His prime duty was to contain the Huk rebellion, and he intended to do just that. But ?rst, he must win the people’s con?dence on the soldiers. The soldiers must regain the people’s sympathy and cooperation through good behavior and willingness to help.

       Magsaysay never ?inched in disciplining erring men-in-uniform. Abusive soldiers were quickly dealt with. He ordered soldiers relieved for cases such as manhandling, bribery, involvement in rackets ranging from illegal lease of rice lands to the collection of protection money from landlords. Magsaysay also entertained complaints from civilians against the army.

        On the other hand, he recognized the needs of soldiers in the ?eld, as Magsaysay often visited them unannounced. There was an incident wherein Magsaysay sneaked into a camp and stole the guard’s gun. He had to ?re the gun for them to be noticed.

       These surprise visits of the Defense Secretary kept the soldiers in a constant state of readiness. Magsaysay wanted not only to see the combat situation, but also to gauge the improvement of relation between the army and the people.

       He also encouraged the soldiers to speak about their problems; promising them quick solutions. His sympathy to the plight of the soldiers was real. Once he got a telegram from a group of 700 soldiers in Iloilo who had not been paid for two months because of a circular. Disregarding the circular, he immediately boarded a plane with a ?nance of?cer and went to Iloilo. He personally saw to it that the soldiers get paid, even if it was in the middle of the night.

       On December 23, 1950, riding with Magsaysay’s successes in military operations against the Huks, Executive Order No. 389 (reorganizing the AFP) was issued. It was the ?rst such reorganization of the Armed Forces since World War

II.

       But the most revealing of Magsaysay’s unstoppable drive to reorganize the AFP was the dismissal of General Mariano Castañeda, a World War II hero (and the man who kicked the grenade meant to kill Pres. Roxas) and now Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces. The General was widely believed to have used the military to insure Quirino’s victory in the 1949 presidential election (touted as the dirtiest and most violent election in Philippine history).

       The General and Magsaysay had been at odds since Magsaysay became a congressman. Magsaysay saw Castañeda as a stumbling block in the reorganization of the AFP. Castañeda regarded Magsaysay as an intruder in his turf (the two nearly came to shooting each other). In spite of Castañeda’s closeness to Pres. Quirino, he was replaced as Chief-of-Staff. This in accordance to Magsaysay’s stern request to Pres. Quirino.

       Magsaysay knew that aside from being efficient in ?ghting the Huks, the soldiers should embolden the people to cooperate with them in rooting out the rebels hiding among the civilians. Magsaysay’s brand of discipline had the people convinced of the soldiers’ concern to the welfare of the civilians. The people’s faith to the army was restored. The people, once again, began to trust the government. The imminence of defeat began to hover over the Huks.

       Magsaysay, however, never really believed in the total victory of the army over the rebels. He knew that the roots of the uprising were countless years of agrarian unrest, dehumanizing poverty, landlessness, and the inequality of laws, wages, rights, and economic opportunities. As long as the government fails to address these problems, a rebel there will be, and he will not always be a Huk.

       But his success in whipping the army into an effective ?ghting force, and his equally successful effort to gain the people’s con?dence jumpstarted the enormous trust that the Filipinos bestowed on him in the presidential election of 1953.

       Magsaysay’s maverick style of governance, his direct approach and mobility, drew criticisms from other government officials; calling his style “to burdensome as the president wasted time on matters too trivial to require action above the departmental level of public administration.”

       But it inspired a presidential leadership intently focused on the welfare of the common man.

       The Nationalists may win points in criticizing his government for being too trusting and accommodating to the Americans, but they can never dent the good image of Magsaysay as an iron-willed, graft busting, ethical president.

      Indeed, Magsaysay discouraged his family and relatives to work in the government while he is president. And woe to anyone who offer him monetary considerations in exchange for a favor (they get kicked out of his sight faster than a speeding bullet).

        Magsaysay is an anathema to a political system relying on the assumption that all men in power are corruptible. His decision not to use power for personal bene?t would have ushered in a chain reaction that could have destroyed that system.

        But he died while the going was high. There was no one to take his place and carry on his legacy. But still, the memory of Magsaysay mamboing in an era of genuine presidential propensity to social justice, however briely it is, is an inspiring episode in Philippine history.

       It serves as a notice that his kind is possible here. And for a country perennially down in the quagmire of graft and corruption, his memory is Hope Eternal.

WHEN THE FILIPINO FIRST PROVED HIMSELF TO THE WORLD
by Cielo Reyno

      In May 1884, at the Exposicion Nacional de Bellas Artes held in Madrid, the Jury of Honor awarded the first of the three gold medals of the competition to Juan Luna for his painting Spoliarium, his blunt depiction of dying and dead gladiators being brutally dragged to be despoiled of their armor in the basement of Rome’s Colosseum.  It was an unprecedented triumph not only for the Filipino community in Spain but also for the Filipinos.

       Luna was lionized by the Spanish and Filipino intelligentsia, foremost of whom was Rizal.   During a fete held in his honor, Rizal acclaimed Luna (and F. Resurreccion Hidalgo, who won 9th silver medal for his painting Virgenes Cristianas) “genuine and pure glories of two peoples!”  For Rizal, Luna and Hidalgo embodied the highest ideals that the Filipino could aspire for- and proof that the soil of Filipinas, plowed by Mother Spain through three centuries of colonization, was not sterile after all but fertile, storing in its depths the seeds of genius that finally blossomed in the two.  For Rizal, Luna’s victory was a slap against Mother Spain’s neglect of her Filipino children, neglect tantamount to myopia, and worst- injustice.  He called on the Filipino youth- “the sacred hope of our country”, to “emulate these great examples (Luna & Hidalgo)…” and in their emulation bring about the longed-for reforms that would liberate their countrymen from the bonds of poverty, ignorance, and injustice.

      Though besting two established Spanish artists by winning the 1st gold medal, Luna, only 27, was not given the “Prize of Honor”, the highest accolade usually given to the top winner.  This lapse on the part of the Jury was later rectified and Luna’s genius vindicated when during his formal presentation before King Alfonso XII, the latter congratulated him and there and then conveyed his commiseration over the “Prize of Honor” issue.  News of this spread and eventually reached the Spanish Senate, which promptly rectified the situation by commissioning Luna to do a painting of the Battle of Lepanto (Spanish victory against the Moors).  No less than the Queen Regent Maria Cristina herself (widow of King Alfonso) unveiled his painting at the Senate Hall in November 1887.  Earlier, Spoliarium’s success came full circle when the local government of Barcelona purchased it from Luna.  At this point, one would have thought that he had enough glory and honor to last him a lifetime, but he outdid himself again when upon Royal order of the Queen Regent of Spain, he received the Medal of Isabela La Catolica bestowed by the Ministry of Ultramar, for his “outstanding service” to Spain.

      Luna’s success was the result of years of discipline and hard work.   Despite the tragedies that later struck his life- his daughter’s death, his wife’s death by his hand- he refused to buckle under, focusing instead on his work.  He turned out masterpiece after masterpiece, eventually accomplishing an oeuvre of over a hundred works and continued to fight for reforms for his country.

      No wonder Luna deplored Filipino students wasting their lives away in Madrid by gambling, bringing shame to their countrymen and abandoning the higher goal of proving that Filipinos were worthy of the respect of other nations.  He urged them to follow his friend Rizal, knowing that despite a life of penury and hunger, often taking school exams on an empty stomach, Rizal persisted in his studies and writing in order to achieve freedom for the Filipinos.

      In carrying out their cause, Luna anticipated Rizal by two years (Noli Me Tangere was finished in 1886).  Spoliarium was not so much an offering for Mother Spain, but a rallying cry to Filipinos, whose sense of nationhood was yet a dream unborn.  Only the educated Filipinos then had begun to grasp the meaning of nation or national identity–   Luna, Rizal, Del Pila, Lopez Jaena, and other Filipinos had formed themselves into the Propaganda, a movement agitating for reforms in the Philippines as a means to free their countrymen from the cycle of poverty and ignorance.  Spoliarium was not only a victory for the Filipinos but a tribute to their struggle for freedom and justice.

       Many of his generation died in the country’s service –Jaena and Del Pilar succumbing to tuberculosis and Rizal shot all within one year (1896).  Three years later, Luna died of a heart attack in Hong Kong.  After serving as diplomat of the Philippine revolutionary government, he had hoped to return to join the new struggle for independence.  He did not know that he had already done his part 15 years back, by proving to the world that the Filipinos had a right to be free, equal to any nation on earth.

THE HISTORY OF THE FIRST PHILIPPINE ASSEMBLY (1907-1916)

      It was the inauguration of the First Philippine Assembly in 1907 that paved the way for the country’s independence from American rule as it provided the Filipino legislators to have hands-on in the local political affairs. This event was very significant in the history of Philippine politics while this event also witnessed the first national election in our country through popular votes. The Filipinos’ aspirations for greater political participation and their thirst for self-rule were realized in the establishment of the Philippine legislature. This glorious victory of the Filipinos was accompanied with enormous responsibilities because they have to prove to the U.S Congress, the international community, and to the Filipino nation that the Filipinos could govern themselves properly and dutifully.

       In consonance to the benevolent assimilation policy by President McKinley was the American provisional government in the Philippines which were manifested by the establishment of both military government and civil government whose objective was to prepare the Filipino for self-government in the ways of democracy once they proved their worthiness for independence. Thus President McKinley stated: “The Philippines is ours, not to exploit but develop, to civilize, to educate, to train in the science of self-government.”

Creation of the Philippine Assembly

      To limit Filipinos’ involvement in the legislative procedure exclusively in the Philippine Commission is against the American policy. This nonetheless led to the campaign for political empowerment of the Filipinos by widening their sphere of influence in the legislation. The creation of Philippine Assembly was credited to William Howard Taft who zealously propagated what he believed would deeply improve the relations between the U.S and the Philippines. He pointed out that America should involve more Filipinos in the task of law if she would like to win the support of the Filipinos. In order to make this possible, he suggested that an assembly be comprise of and elected by Filipinos. Just one month after he arrived in the country, he commissioned Secretary of War Elihu Root to make amendments in the manner by which laws were made for the Philippines. He facilitated the creation of a legislature made up of the Philippine Commission as the upper house and his proposed Filipino assembly as the lower house

        The campaign for the formation of Filipino assembly was backed in the United States Congress by Henry Allen Cooper, the chairman of the House Committee on Insular Affairs. Congressman Cooper campaigned for the creation of a popularly elected Filipino assembly to share legislative power with the Philippine Commission. Thus, he came up with his Philippine Bill but it had three conditions. First, there should be prevalence of general and complete peace in the country and that all those territories not inhabited by Muslims and other non-Christian tribes recognize the authority. Second, the Philippine Commission must conduct a census of the population and have the results be published. Third, peace must be sustained for two years after the census had been taken and its results published. The president of the United States was empowered by the bill to command the Philippine Commission to call for a general election to elect delegates to the popular assembly which would then be known as the Philippine Assembly.

      The first law passed by the U.S Congress concerning the government of the Philippines was the Cooper Act, better known as the Philippine Act of 1902. It was passed by Congress on July 1, 1902. The Bill provided that the membership of the assembly should not be less than 50 but not more than 100 to be equitably apportioned by the Philippine Commission among the provinces according to population. More specifically, it provided each province to have at least one delegate. In contrast, province with large populations could have more than one delegate.

      Pursuant to the Cooper Act of 1902, the Philippine Commission executed the provisions of the law.  The census was completed in 1903 and published on March 27, 1905 and general peace and complete peace was observed in the country. However, Governor-General Luke Wright issued a proclamation that it had to reign for two more years before elections for the Philippine Assembly would be called. The Philippine Commission notified President Roosevelt that there had been two years of general and complete peace in the territories not inhabited by Muslims and other non-Christian tribes from time that the census had been published. President Roosevelt in turn, authorized Governor Wright to make a proclamation calling for such an election.

      The national election for the Philippine Assembly was participated by two prominent political parties in the country- the Partido Nacionalista and the Partido Nacional Progresista. The Nacionalista Party was the result of the merging on March 12 1907 of two nationalist groups, namely, the Partido Union Nacionalista whose members included Rafael Palma, Galicano Apacible, Pablo Ocampo, Leon Ma. Guerero, Rafael del Pan, and Felipe Agoncillo, and the Partido Independista Imediatista, whose members included Alberto Barretto, Sergio Osmeña, Manuel L. Quezon, Justo Lukban, Fernando Ma. Guerrero, Jose de la Vina, Francisco Liongson, Macario Adriatico, and Vicente Miranda. The Progresista Party formerly known as Federalista Party was a pro-American party prior to the election in 1907 but shifted its ideology to becoming pro-Filipinos by calling for an independent democratic government, was led by Arsenio Cruz Herrera.

       The much awaited first national election for the Philippine Assembly was realized on July 30 1907, the candidates were all clamoring for a total of 80 seats, as set by the Philippine Commission. There were in all 104, 996 registered voters, but the number of those who voted was only 98, 251. Qualified to vote were males, at least 23 years old. The Nacionalista won 31 seats (plus one, Manuel L. Quezon who chose to run as an independent); the Independientes, 20; the Progresistas, 16; Immediatistas, 7; and other minor political parties, 5. None of the political parties had a majority in the assembly.

       Prominent personalities in the Revolutionary Government held important posts. Among these were Pedro Paterno, who had been president of the Malolos Congress; Felipe Agoncillo, who had been Aguinaldo’s diplomat in the U.S; and Leon Ma. Guerero, Aguedo Velarde, and Alberto Barretto who had held important posts in the Malolos Government. The elections of 1907 indicated that Filipino electorates had profound confidence for delegates who have background in lawmaking; there were 48 lawyers who occupied seats in the First Philippine Assembly. The rest were landowners; businessmen; businessmen-landowners; doctors; and a priest.

The Inauguration of the First Philippine Assembly

      The date October 16, 1907 was a historical event as the Philippine Assembly was  formally inaugurated at the Grand Opera House, Manila. Secretary of War Taft made a special trip to Manila for the sole purpose of attending the inaugural ceremony. He and Governor-General Smith addressed the new legislative body. Bishop Jose Barlin of Naga gave the invocation prayer. After it was convened, the Philippine Assembly proceeded to organize itself. The 29-year old governor of Cebu, Sergio Osmeña was chosen Speaker of the Assembly. His friend and former classmate, Manuel L. Quezon, representing the first district of Tayabas became the majority floor leader, and Vicente Singson, representing the first district of Ilocos Sur, as minority floor leader. Both Osmeña and Quezon were only 29 years old, but both of them were experienced politicians because they had served as provincial governors first before they ran for national seat. After the assembly created 30 standing committees and elected their respective chairmen that reportedly took 40 minutes, Secretary Taft declared the Philippine Legislature open.

       The rules of legislature body were patterned after those of the U.S House of Representatives. The assembly came up with two changes from the U.S rules: first, it combined the Ways and Means Committee with the various appropriations committees in the U.S model, creating a powerful single committee known as the Committee on Ways and Means and Appropriations. Another important change was that the Speaker does not assume the post of chairman of the Committee on Rules, unlike U.S practice.

      The major contribution of the First Philippine Assembly was its effort to revive the issue of independence with the cooperation of the Philippine Commission. The Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly approved its first joint resolution of on October 19, 1907 expressing its gratitude to President of the United States, the Congress and the people of the United States in behalf of the Philippine Assembly and Filipino citizens for having bestowed upon them the privilege to participate in the political affairs and make laws that directly govern them.

SPEAKER SERGIO OSMENA CARRIES ON THE INDEPENDENCE STRUGGLE
by Cielo G. Reyno

      Perhaps it was not a mere quirk of fate that his death on 19 October 1961 occurred close to the anniversary of the institution that first catapulted him to national prominence, and with which his name will always be intertwined.  Osmeña, together with the Philippine Assembly, embodied the Filipinos’ relentless struggle for the highest ideal—national independence.

      The struggle went on despite the official end of the Philippine War for independence in 1902 and the passage of the Philippine Organic Act that same year, the latter providing the establishment of the First Philippine Assembly in 1907.  In truth, the Assembly was part of the American campaign to pacify the country.  It was the last effort to finally stamp out whatever remained of the revolutionary aspiration of the Filipino people that, shortly before then, was still being waged by the likes of Macario Sakay, executed a month before the Assembly’s inauguration in October.

      Osmeña’s path to prominence began at age 21, when he was tapped to be emissary for the revolutionary junta of Cebu, witnessing firsthand the destruction of the First Philippine Republic by the American military forces.  At 22 he became publisher and editor of the newspaper El Nuevo Dia (The New Day), later ordered closed by American authorities for reporting the American debacle in Balangiga, Samar in 1901.  Garnering second place in the 1903 bar exams, he was hired by then Cebu Governor Juan Climaco as legal adviser.    At 27, he was elected Cebu’s governor.

      Meanwhile the ground was being paved for the establishment of the Assembly.  Heeding the call for Filipinos to join in the parliamentary struggle, Osmeña ran for a seat in the Assembly as a member of the Nacionalista Party whose platform was, “immediate, absolute, and complete independence”.  In the elections of July 1907, his party won more than 50% of the Assembly’s seats.  On October 16, the Assembly elected Sergio Osmeña as Speaker, the first Filipino to hold such position, subordinate only to the American Governor General.  He became the vanguard of the new generation of Filipino leaders, admired for his integrity and work ethic, setting the highest standards in public service.

      From the outset he made Assembly the new bastion of the nationalist cause.  Knowing that the battle for independence had now shifted from the battlefield to the halls of the Ayuntamiento, he adopted a three-pronged strategy to bring the Filipinos closer to realizing their dream: to make laws that would benefit the people, expand Filipinos’ governing capacity by widening the powers of the Assembly; and develop nationalist leaders.

      In carrying these out, he inevitably brought the Assembly into several run-ins  with the Philippine Commission the upper house. One of these involved the Assembly’s rejection of the Philippine Commission’s choice of the Resident commissioner to the United States, on the ground that being the Commission’s choice he did not represent the Filipinos’ interest.

Another face-off involved Osmeña’s advocacy of an authentic Philippine Constitution that would replace the Organic Law of 1902.  In June 1908, during the closure of the first session of the Assembly, he outlined its modest achievements, which included the expansion of education opportunities for all Filipino children through the passage of the Gabaldon Act; the establishment of an agriculture bank, the establishment of bureaus for forestry and for labor.  Finally he made a formal declaration of that the Filipinos had not abandoned their aspiration for independence and will continue to aspire for independence its realization.  His fellow Assemblymen gave him a resounding cheer.

      Osmeña knew nevertheless that the conflict with the colonial masters was far from over.  In the next years, the conflict intensified with the drafting of what eventually became the Jones Law of 1916.  He helped draft  the law, sending his suggestions through constant communication with then Washington-based Resident Commissioner Manuel L. Quezon who in turn relayed his ideas to American Congressman W. Atkinson Jones, author of the law.  More important, Osmeña fought to keep the preamble with the crucial passage: “It is…the purpose of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to recognize their independence as soon as a stable government can be established therein…”

      Though unacknowledged for his role in the drafting of the Jones Law, Osmeña continued his work even after Quezon supplanted him as the Filipinos’ foremost leader in the struggle toward nationhood.  It would take decades and the ravages of a World War before he would finally see his efforts come to fruition in 1946, when the United States finally withdrew its sovereignty over the Philippines and recognized Philippine Independence.

      It is common for Filipinos to look for someone to idolize –saints, politicians, artists, models, etc., somebody they will glorify and imitate. Since the time of the declaration of Philippine independence, 109 years ago, many were acknowledged as Filipino heroes, more so today, that every individual who become so popular or the main character in any particular event is given the title “hero”. The essence of the word “hero” is past declining, today one need not to die or do such gallant act to be given the noble title or that some just won a boxing match. Time has really evolved and so does our standard in defining a Filipino hero. Will our forefathers who gave their lives for freedom feel insulted for this? Are these the Filipinos we’ll look up to for guidance through the times, aren’t our children losing the true meaning of heroism by our doings? All these things we should ask ourselves before giving the title “hero” to anyone.

      But what does being a hero mean? Dr. Esteban de Ocampo, a known historian, stated in his book about Rizal that a hero means a prominent or central personage taking an admirable part in any remarkable action or event; a person of distinguished valor or enterprise in danger, or fortitude in suffering; and a man honored after death by public worship because of exceptional service to mankind. The true heroes of Philippine history deserve to be called so for they didn’t have any idea that one day they will be measured up, they just acted upon their principles. The concept of honoring heroes came only to the Philippines in 1900, when the Philippine Commission (Pardo de Tavera, Legarda, Luzurriaga (Filipino members) and headed by William Howard Taft) approved Act No. 137 combining the districts of Morong and Manila to be named as “Province of Rizal,” in honor of the most illustrious Filipino. Actually, this Act was disputed by many but the basis of the Commission was so strong that it has surpassed the public’s questions.

     Since then, heroes were celebrated here and there, citing their names in every politician’s speeches, declaring holidays, naming streets, constructing monuments, etc. in their honor. Until one day, realizing that so many names were acknowledged as heroes, need to evaluate the situation was proposed. During Marcos’ presidency, he tasked the National Heroes Commission to come up with the criteria for national hero. On March 28, 1993, thru the President’s Executive Order No. 75, the National Heroes Committee was created, commissioned to study, evaluate and recommend historical figures to be declared as national heroes. The Committee composed of worthy members, with a series of discussions came up with the new criteria.

      The criteria is composed of 10 standards: First is the extent of a person’s sacrifices for the welfare of the country. Second, the motive and methods employed in the attainment of the ideal (was his ideal purely for the welfare of the country and without any taint of self-interested motives, most of all the method of attainment should be morally valid). The third is the moral character of the person concerned (the person should not have any immorality issue that affected his ideal). The fourth is the influence of the person concerned on his age and or the succeeding age. Fifth is that heroes are those who have a concept of nation and thereafter aspire and struggle for the nation’s freedom (they must have desired the country’s freedom in any situation especially when there’s a threat of invasion in any form). Sixth is that heroes are those who define and contribute to a system of life of freedom and order for a nation (one who helps in the orderliness and betterment of the country).  Seventh is, heroes are those who contribute to the quality of life and destiny of a nation. Eight, a hero is part of the people’s expression (the citizen must have recognized and acknowledged the person as a hero). Ninth, a hero thinks of the future, especially the future generations, his concern for the future generations must be seen in his decisions and ideals). Lastly, the choice of a hero involves not only the recounting of an episode or events in history, but of the entire process that made this particular person a hero.

       Filipino’s expectations of public figures are different now than it was more than a hundred years ago, maybe because of the realization that no one is perfect. This is the reason why today so many were acknowledged as heroes and many were voted in important governing positions with flaws and questionable characters. Lucky are those who aspire one day to be called a hero that the criteria was already set to pattern their decisions with. I hope that the criteria for national heroes will not only be checked against the historical figures but also with the politicians to whom we will entrust the power to govern our country.

THE TWO FACES OF THE 1872 CAVITE MUTINY
By Chris Antonette Piedad-Pugay

      The 12th of June of every year since 1898 is a very important event for all the Filipinos.  In this particular day, the entire Filipino nation as well as Filipino communities all over the world gathers to celebrate the Philippines’ Independence Day.  1898 came to be a very significant year for all of us— it is as equally important as 1896—the year when the Philippine Revolution broke out owing to the Filipinos’ desire to be free from the abuses of the Spanish colonial regime.  But we should be reminded that another year is as historic as the two—1872.

       Two major events happened in 1872, first was the 1872 Cavite Mutiny and the other was the martyrdom of the three martyr priests in the persons of Fathers Mariano Gomes, Jose Burgos and Jacinto Zamora (GOMBURZA).  However, not all of us knew that there were different accounts in reference to the said event.  All Filipinos must know the different sides of the story—since this event led to another tragic yet meaningful part of our history—the execution of GOMBURZA which in effect a major factor in the awakening of nationalism among the Filipinos.

1872 Cavite Mutiny: Spanish Perspective

       Jose Montero y Vidal, a prolific Spanish historian documented the event and highlighted it as an attempt of the Indios to overthrow the Spanish government in the Philippines. Meanwhile, Gov. Gen. Rafael Izquierdo’s official report magnified the event and made use of it to implicate the native clergy, which was then active in the call for secularization.  The two accounts complimented and corroborated with one other, only that the general’s report was more spiteful. Initially, both Montero and Izquierdo scored out that the abolition of privileges enjoyed by the workers of Cavite arsenal such as non-payment of tributes and exemption from force labor were the main reasons of the “revolution” as how they called it, however, other causes were enumerated by them including the Spanish Revolution which overthrew the secular throne, dirty propagandas proliferated by unrestrained press, democratic, liberal and republican books and pamphlets reaching the Philippines, and most importantly, the presence of the native clergy who out of animosity against the Spanish friars, “conspired and supported” the rebels and enemies of Spain.  In particular, Izquierdo blamed the unruly Spanish Press for “stockpiling” malicious propagandas grasped by the Filipinos.  He reported to the King of Spain that the “rebels” wanted to overthrow the Spanish government to install a new “hari” in the likes of Fathers Burgos and Zamora.  The general even added that the native clergy enticed other participants by giving them charismatic assurance that their fight will not fail because God is with them coupled with handsome promises of rewards such as employment, wealth, and ranks in the army.  Izquierdo, in his report lambasted the Indios as gullible and possessed an innate propensity for stealing.

       The two Spaniards deemed that the event of 1872 was planned earlier and was thought of it as a big conspiracy among educated leaders, mestizos, abogadillos or native lawyers, residents of Manila and Cavite and the native clergy.  They insinuated that the conspirators of Manila and Cavite planned to liquidate high-ranking Spanish officers to be followed by the massacre of the friars.  The alleged pre-concerted signal among the conspirators of Manila and Cavite was the firing of rockets from the walls of Intramuros.

     According to the accounts of the two, on 20 January 1872, the district of Sampaloc celebrated the feast of the Virgin of Loreto, unfortunately participants to the feast celebrated the occasion with the usual fireworks displays.  Allegedly, those in Cavite mistook the fireworks as the sign for the attack, and just like what was agreed upon, the 200-men contingent headed by Sergeant Lamadrid launched an attack targeting Spanish officers at sight and seized the arsenal.

       When the news reached the iron-fisted Gov. Izquierdo, he readily ordered the reinforcement of the Spanish forces in Cavite to quell the revolt.  The “revolution” was easily crushed when the expected reinforcement from Manila did not come ashore.  Major instigators including Sergeant Lamadrid were killed in the skirmish, while the GOMBURZA were tried by a court-martial and were sentenced to die by strangulation.  Patriots like Joaquin Pardo de Tavera, Antonio Ma. Regidor, Jose and Pio Basa and other abogadillos were suspended by the Audencia (High Court) from the practice of law, arrested and were sentenced with life imprisonment at the Marianas Island.  Furthermore, Gov. Izquierdo dissolved the native regiments of artillery and ordered the creation of artillery force to be composed exclusively of the Peninsulares.

        On 17 February 1872 in an attempt of the Spanish government and Frailocracia to instill fear among the Filipinos so that they may never commit such daring act again, the GOMBURZA were executed.  This event was tragic but served as one of the moving forces that shaped Filipino nationalism.

A Response to Injustice: The Filipino Version of the Incident

        Dr. Trinidad Hermenigildo Pardo de Tavera, a Filipino scholar and researcher, wrote the Filipino version of the bloody incident in Cavite.  In his point of view, the incident was a mere mutiny by the native Filipino soldiers and laborers of the Cavite arsenal who turned out to be dissatisfied with the abolition of their privileges.  Indirectly, Tavera blamed Gov. Izquierdo’s cold-blooded policies such as the abolition of privileges of the workers and native army members of the arsenal and the prohibition of the founding of school of arts and trades for the Filipinos, which the general believed as a cover-up for the organization of a political club.

       On 20 January 1872, about 200 men comprised of soldiers, laborers of the arsenal, and residents of Cavite headed by Sergeant Lamadrid rose in arms and assassinated the commanding officer and Spanish officers in sight.  The insurgents were expecting support from the bulk of the army unfortunately, that didn’t happen.  The news about the mutiny reached authorities in Manila and Gen. Izquierdo immediately ordered the reinforcement of Spanish troops in Cavite.  After two days, the mutiny was officially declared subdued.

      Tavera believed that the Spanish friars and Izquierdo used the Cavite Mutiny as a powerful lever by magnifying it as a full-blown conspiracy involving not only the native army but also included residents of Cavite and Manila, and more importantly the native clergy to overthrow the Spanish government in the Philippines.  It is noteworthy that during the time, the Central Government in Madrid announced its intention to deprive the friars of all the powers of intervention in matters of civil government and the direction and management of educational institutions.  This turnout of events was believed by Tavera, prompted the friars to do something drastic in their dire sedire to maintain power in the Philippines.

       Meanwhile, in the intention of installing reforms, the Central Government of Spain welcomed an educational decree authored by Segismundo Moret promoted the fusion of sectarian schools run by the friars into a school called Philippine Institute.  The decree proposed to improve the standard of education in the Philippines by requiring teaching positions in such schools to be filled by competitive examinations. This improvement was warmly received by most Filipinos in spite of the native clergy’s zest for secularization.

       The friars, fearing that their influence in the Philippines would be a thing of the past, took advantage of the incident and presented it to the Spanish Government as a vast conspiracy organized throughout the archipelago with the object of destroying Spanish sovereignty. Tavera sadly confirmed that the Madrid government came to believe that the scheme was true without any attempt to investigate the real facts or extent of the alleged “revolution” reported by Izquierdo and the friars.

       Convicted educated men who participated in the mutiny were sentenced life imprisonment while members of the native clergy headed by the GOMBURZA were tried and executed by garrote.  This episode leads to the awakening of nationalism and eventually to the outbreak of Philippine Revolution of 1896.  The French writer Edmund Plauchut’s account complimented Tavera’s account by confirming that the event happened due to discontentment of the arsenal workers and soldiers in Cavite fort.  The Frenchman, however, dwelt more on the execution of the three martyr priests which he actually witnessed.

Unraveling the Truth

       Considering the four accounts of the 1872 Mutiny, there were some basic facts that remained to be unvarying: First, there was dissatisfaction among the workers of the arsenal as well as the members of the native army after their privileges were drawn back by Gen. Izquierdo; Second, Gen. Izquierdo introduced rigid and strict policies that made the Filipinos move and turn away from Spanish government out of disgust; Third, the Central Government failed to conduct an investigation on what truly transpired but relied on reports of Izquierdo and the friars and the opinion of the public; Fourth, the happy days of the friars were already numbered in 1872 when the Central Government in Spain decided to deprive them of the power to intervene in government affairs as well as in the direction and management of schools prompting them to commit frantic moves to extend their stay and power; Fifth,  the Filipino clergy members actively participated in the secularization movement in order to  allow Filipino priests to take hold of the parishes in the country making them prey to the rage of the friars; Sixth, Filipinos during the time were active participants, and responded to what they deemed as injustices; and Lastly, the execution of GOMBURZA was a blunder on the part of the Spanish government, for the action severed the ill-feelings of the Filipinos and the event inspired Filipino patriots to call for reforms and eventually independence.  There may be different versions of the event, but one thing is certain, the 1872 Cavite Mutiny paved way for a momentous 1898.

        The road to independence was rough and tough to toddle, many patriots named and unnamed shed their bloods to attain reforms and achieve independence.  12 June 1898 may be a glorious event for us, but we should not forget that before we came across to victory, our forefathers suffered enough.  As weenjoy our freeedom, may we be more historically aware of our past to have a better future ahead of us.  And just like what Elias said in Noli me Tangere, may we “not forget those who fell during the night.”

THE BALMIS MISSION: AN EXTRAORDINARY EXPEDITION
by Ma. Cielito G. Reyno

      On April 15, 1805 the vaccine against smallpox, one of the deadliest and most physically disfiguring diseases ever known to man, arrived in the Philippines.  Headed by Dr. Francisco Xavier de Balmis, court physician of the Spanish crown, the medical life-saving mission in charge of transporting the vaccine to the Philippines set out from La Coruña, Spain on November 30, 1803 and journeyed to Acapulco, Mexico.  There, 25 Mexican children were drafted to take on the most important part of the mission: hosting the vaccine in their bodies until the mission reached the archipelago.  Starting with the first human repository, the vaccine was transferred from one child to the other every ninth or tenth day when the smallpox vesicle or blister developed on the host’s skin, from which a portion of the lymph or fluid within the vesicle was extracted and inserted into the arm of the next child-host.

      Historical findings indicate that smallpox was not originally endemic to the Philippines, specifically during the early part of Spanish colonial rule.  This is shown by the persistency of destructive outbreaks of the disease as recorded by Spanish officials starting from as early as 1574, only three years after Spanish colonization formally began in 1571.  An excerpt from the report from that year of the Augustinian missionary Martin de Rada to the Philippine Governor General gives a stark picture of the yearlong destructiveness over the native population of Manila then: “A general epidemic of smallpox has raged here this year, which has spared neither childhood, youth, nor old age.  I believe there are few who have not had it…and many people have died of it.”  According to historian Ken de Bevoise, data show that virus that came from Mexico, entering the archipelago through Manila, the “principal port of entry for infections” at the time, may have caused this epidemic.  However, there were other points of entry such as the ports in Northern Luzon: in 1789 the disease entered the Ilocos region through a Chinese vessel, quickly unleashing an epidemic in the region.

      Since Manila was under the control of the Spanish colonial government the disease spread more easily to other points in the archipelago through the  pacification campaigns.  This is exemplified by the military operations carried out in Cagayan province (then known as Nueva Segovia), which sparked an epidemic that left a trail of death and sickness not only on the province but in the nearby islands as well.  After the initial contagion, outbreaks became periodic, prompting an official to describe smallpox “like a plague among the Indians.”  It would seem that no region was spared (including the Visayas and Mindanao) for where there was a military campaign, smallpox eruptions inevitably followed.  Thus, during the government’s operations in Bohol “more than a century later”, (probably referring to the Dagohoy Revolt, 1744-1829), an outbreak occurred, as also in the islands of Samar and Leyte in the 1760s of which it was reported that  “a third of the population” was wiped out.  In the Mindanao region, smallpox was recorded to have struck Sulu in 1608.  With its record of death and annihilation, no wonder smallpox was acknowledged during the 19th century Philippine society along, with malaria, as one of the “major causes of mortality since the [Spanish] conquest” (De Bevoise).  The high birth rate of the native population, moreover, abetted the frequency of the outbreaks since this facilitated a quick replacement of persons vulnerable to the disease.

       Fortunately, by 1798 in Europe, a vaccine against the disease had been developed by the English physician Dr. Edward Jenner, using the cowpox virus.  This provided the longed-for deliverance from the plague.  Spain lost no time in acquiring or developing its own vaccine, and in September 1803, Spanish King Carlos IV ordered the organization of an expedition which would send the smallpox vaccine to Spain’s Asian colony, the Philippines.    Dr. Balmis, who had initiated the public vaccination programs in Spain’s colonies, headed the Philippine expedition.  On the local front after the arrival of the vaccine, Philippine Governor General Mariano Fernandez de Folgueras, created the Insular Bureau of Vaccination in 1806 and ordered the carrying out of public vaccination to institutionalize the system of vaccination in the country.

       Meanwhile, as token of gratitude, upon the Filipino people’s clamor the erection of a monument in honor of King Carlos IV was initiated in 1824, and finally accomplished during the term of Governor Emilio Terrero y Perinat (1885-1888).  The statue was placed in Plaza McKinley (formerly Plaza del Palacio) fronting the Manila Cathedral.  Part of the Spanish inscription read:

      “Al Rey D. Carlos IV.  En gratitude Al Don Benefico de le Vacuna.- Los Habitantes de Filipinas.”  (“To the King Charles IV of Bourbon, to the express the gratitude of the inhabitants of the Philippines for the beneficial gift of vaccination.”).

      On April 15 2004, 99 years after the Balmis expedition reached the Philippines, a marker was installed at the Research Institute for Tropical Medicine (RITM) in Alabang, Muntinlupa honoring the expedition, its leading lights- Carlos IV and Dr. Balmis- and the 25 Mexican children, who, despite the long and risky voyage, took part in the noble task of saving other children on the other side of the world.

      Official records show that the implementation of the public vaccination of the Filipinos was not exactly successful even until the arrival of the Americans in 1898, mainly due to geographical inaccessibility of far flung barrios and villages, the unwieldy method of preserving the vaccine, and the instinctive resistance of the people themselves to immunization.  Notwithstanding these failures, the vision that the Balmis Mission of 1803-1805 presented to the Filipino people of the 19th century was that of a more hopeful, better life free of the scourge that was smallpox.

RIZAL THE FUTURIST
by Dr. Pablo S. Trillana II on the 103rd Anniversary of the Martyrdom of Dr. Jose Rizal (1999)

“Protean is the word that comes to mind when we speak of the Filipino national hero Dr. Jose Rizal. Novelist, poet, teacher, linguist, ophthalmologist, sportsman, sculptor, essayist,thinker. He was all of the above. But there is one aspect of Rizal’s brilliance that is seldom discussed — Rizal as a futurist.  Rizal was always years ahead of his time.”

     Now that we are closing the door on one millennium and opening the door to the next, there could not be a more propitious time to dwell on this great man’s prophetic insights.

     Even before holism was adopted as a paradigm for the modern world, Rizal had already applied the theory to his school in Dapitan, where he strove to teach the “whole man”. In addition to offering formal academic subjects, he taught his pupils boxing, swimming, fencing, agriculture, and the need for community services. As an important part of their education, he took them on venturesome excursions to test their mettle in real situations. For he believed it was in the unpredictable world where intelligence was needed most.

      As a statesman without portfolio, his vision of the Filipino nation and his precepts for its guidance are as fresh today as they were a hundred years ago. In Noli Me Tangere, his first novel, Rizal warned Spanish authorities of the blood bath their colonial policy, or lack of policy, would lead to. In Noll’s sequel, El Filibusterismo, he predicted the coming of a revolution while hinting, in the same breath, that the revolution would fail because the Filipinos lacked the arms and organization to see it through.

     In his most prescient essay, Filipinas Dentro de Gen Anos, written in 1889, he foretold that Spain and the Philippines would eventually become equal independent partners in the world of geopolitics, that the United States, after appropriating the Philippines for herself, would emerge as a new colonial power in Asia.

     One might say that the predictions found in Noli and Fill were merely insights of an alert observer since they were based on the apparent worsening conditions of Spanish colonial rule in the country. But the predictions in Filipinas Dentro de Gen Anos is proof of a complex intellect. We must remember that at the time Rizal wrote the essay, the Revolution of 1896, which would lead to the creation of a Philippine Republic, independent of and equal to Spain, was more than six years away. And America’s presence in Asia would not happen until the turn of the nineteenth century, long after he was dead.

       Rizal foresaw the strengths and weaknesses of the Philippine nation today as it stands on the brink of a new and exciting world. Like a chastising father, he warned us, through the words of Padre Florentino in El Filibusterismo, that we will never have a successful state or bayan, until we also have a successful nation or bansa. There is a world of difference between the two. While statehood provides the infrastructure of government, it is nationhood that creates the temper of governance. What Rizal saw as an ideal nation-state was embodied in La Liga Filipina, yet another one of the hero’s scenarios for the future. Organized on the basis of regional and district councils, La Liga Filipina was envisioned to unite the archipelago into one compact, vigorous, and homogenous body. Members were pledged to mutual assistance in the face of every want and necessity, to provide defense against injustice, to encourage education, agriculture, and commerce, and to study and apply reforms. In short, La Liga was a vision of a moral community in which all of the people worked together for the common good, for a better future.

      That vision, upon which La Liga was founded, is as vital today as it was 100 years ago. Rizal, through his writings and his deeds, has given us a blueprint for our future. But what we do with it is up to us.

      To this day, we are trying to attain Rizal’s ideal of a mutual-aid society. The question is, are we trying hard enough? It is true that we have made great strides in many aspects of national life. But it is also true that all too often we lack the collective spirit to act as one in order to serve the good of all.

      I’m not saying we are unconcerned as a people. Far from it. We can look back to two revolutions – the Revolution of 1896 and the EDSA Revolution of 1986 – to remind ourselves of what we can do and be, when we unite as a people with a common purpose. Should we ever forget, we need only to summon Rizal who wrote, “Very probably the Philippines will defend with indescribable ardor the liberty she has bought at the cost of so much blood and sacrifice. With the new men that will spring from her bosom and the remembrance of the past, she will perhaps enter openly the wide road of progress.”

      If, as Rizal suggests, the past holds the contours of the future, this nation has indeed a lot of solid ground on which to build the just, caring, and progressive society of the future.

      Just as Rizal knew then, we must know now that we can move forward only if we work together, combining our energies toward a common goal and finding direction from the lessons of the past. Let the compass of history guide us into the next one thousand years.

A GUERRILLA’S TRICK THAT WORKED: REMEMBERING STRATEGIES THAT MATTER
By Peter Jaynul V. Uckung

      We always remember World War II in the Philippine as a litany of battles and brutalities. From the Fall of Bataan in April 1942 to the destruction of Manila in February 1945 the Filipinos have experienced all the tragedies of war and in between, the inhumanity of man.

      As time progressed to the eventual unity of our national history, those little moments of victory achieved by our intrepid guerrillas were left unread in the dusty corridors of our libraries, in so doing are forgotten and apathetically ignored.

      Overshadowed by bigger events like the Fall of Bataan, Death March, the Leyte Landing, the Liberation of Manila, the surrender of Yamashita, are events considered local and small in scale compared to others previously mentioned.

      But these small local events hide stories grander by far in its logical appeal to military strategy. And this story is one of them.

 It was early in 1944, in Pagsanjan, Laguna that a group of guerrillas belonging to the Hunters ROTC Guerrillas found itself in dire need of food supply.

      Eating only coconuts and bananas, the guerrillas found their food supply dwindling to alarming level. Besides, the regularity with which they eat coconuts and bananas were driving them almost gastronomically insane. And one banana-full day, their leader, Foy Bautista suffered diarrhea.

      Unable to get food from other towns as these towns were under different guerrilla group control. And knowing that the Japanese garrison in Pagsanjan, which was located at the school atop a hill overlooking the town, had more than adequate supply of rice and other food, the guerrilla decided to try their luck in getting food from their enemy. But how?

      The garrisoned Japanese had tremendous firepower and were well protected by their hilly sanctuary. Although, consisting of a large number of men, and having the capacity to overwhelm the Japanese forces, the guerrillas decided against attacking the garrison as they fear the reprisal of Japanese reinforcements to the townspeople. It would be expectedly more than just a slap in the butt. Think torture and death.

      So the leader, Foy Bautista, ordered his men to surround the garrison and play like a division to mislead the Japanese soldiers into thinking that the guerrillas were in the thousands.

      Bautista with a white flag then walked straight into the garrison’s gate, demanding to talk with the Japanese commanders.

      The guerrillas fired their guns into the air as they saw their commander talking with the Japanese.

Bautista told the Japanese that a thousand guerrillas were surrounding the garrison and the moment he is killed, they will all be rushing in for the hill. If he would be permitted to talk with the Japanese commander, he would order a cessation of the firing.

      To this, the Japanese acquiesced.  Bautista then demanded that the Japanese supply the guerrillas with rice, in return the guerrilla would not attack the   garrison. The Japanese told him to return that afternoon.

      The interpreter, a Japanese named Ohtta, relayed his message to the Japanese commander, Captain Fujita, who agreed to supply the guerrillas with rice, in return for the promise of guerrilla non-belligerence.

      Peace came gently to Pagsanjan with the food and peace agreement,  the guerrillas and the Japanese took pains not to irritate each other. The guerrillas took advantage of the situation and set up their headquarters in the towns, almost near the Japanese garrison.

      This peaceful air vanished when the Japanese commander was replaced.

      And then on March 15, 1945, the town of Pagsanjan was destroyed, not by the Japanese, but by American bombers who thought that the Japanese forces were still in Pagsanjan. Actually, the Japanese had already left.

      Ironically, it was supposed liberator who destroyed the town.

      Few, if any, remembered the gutsy effort of the guerrillas to get food from the Japanese without inviting violent reprisal from the enemy.  Now, that is a brimful lesson of the war.

THE BATTLE OF MANILA
by Peter Jaynul Uckung

      General Yamashita considered Manila as too vulnerable to American attack and ordered his troops to evacuate to Northern Luzon for a last ditch stand where the mountains stood as national barriers to any military assault.

      Most of his soldiers quickly obeyed his command. But the Japanese naval troops under Rear Admiral Sanji Iwabuchi stayed in Manila; determined to fight to the death. While the main American attack force was sweeping aside feeble Japanese defense position in their push to Manila, Iwabuchi’s forces were laying out an elaborate defense plan around Manila.

     Streets were lined with razor-sharp barbed wires; trucks were overturned as barricades and machine guns placed on seemingly empty houses; naval cannons were brought in from Japanese ships and placed in strategic places; and everywhere mines awaited unwary soldiers. If Manila would be taken, the streets would be awash with Allied blood.

      Bridges were blown off as well as military installations, power and water facilities. Manila stood still as a vengeful Japanese force waited for its final battle with the not-so-distant euphoric Allied army.

     Basking in euphoria were the Americans when they reached the capital on February 4, 1945, sensing victory. But the Japanese defenders would never give them the city in a silver platter.

      The Japanese soldiers fought with the savage ferocity of a wounded beast; displaying a kind of barbarity so alien to the Filipinos and Americans alike.

      Civilian were moved down; old men, women and children. The Japanese massacred them. Shot them, bayoneted them, burned them and raped them. The Japanese rampage in Manila would be remembered in history as one notorious chapter of man’s inhumanity to man.

       Manila was destroyed in the ensuing battle. So fierce was the battle that not even the elegant giant stone buildings that distinguished Manila as one of the most beautiful colonial cities in Asia survive the holocaust.

       A grim tally of 100,000 people perished.

       It was a devastated Manila that the Allied army retook on February 7, 1945. 

THE BATTLE FOR MANILA
by Chris Antonette Pugay

“Leave a way of escape to a surrounded enemy…”
                                                                                          -Chun Tzu

       After the successful landing of Mac Arthur and group in Palo, Leyte on October 20, 1944, the American Liberation Force started its campaign moving towards the north.  As early as January 9 of the succeeding year, a successful landing by the American Forces through the aid of Filipino guerillas took place in Lingayen, Pangasinan allowing them to establish a military position in the northern Luzon area.  On the 30th of January, the Pangatian Camp in Cabanatuan was raided by the combined forces of the Luzon Guerilla Army Force (Lapham) and the US 6th Army Ranger Battalion setting free about 500 prisoners of war.  The next day, the US 8th Army together with the ROTC Hunters Guerilla took the Nasugbu shores unopposed.  After the earlier success, the American troops as well as Filipino guerilla fighters looked forward to secure the city of Manila.

The Major Reasons why the Battle for Manila was fought

       Many people nowadays are asking questions such as, “was a battle really inevitable?” or “Could the destruction of Manila be avoided if the city was bypassed by the Americans?” or “Was the destruction of the city a result of the adamant pressure both from American and Japanese high military officials?”  It is really not easy to give answers to the said questions; however, the only thing that is certain in this concern is that both Japanese and Americans have their own respective reasons in defending the city, which, however, resulted to an ultimate tragedy.

       The possible reasons why Mac Arthur ordered for the capture of Manila could be as follows: (1) The Americans wanted to avenge their 1941 to 1943 humiliation by crushing the Japanese force and taking back the city which is the seat of government and capital of the country; (2) Manila’s liberation would symbolize the Americans’ determination to smash the power of Japan in Western Pacific while allowing the Filipinos to be free; (3) Manila was seen by the Americans particularly by Mac Arthur as the key to the Philippines and the “center of gravity” which was eventually proven wrong because the real center of gravity is in the Northern Luzon area where great battles awaited both Japanese and Americans; (4) If Manila fell, the enemy would have no reason to continue to fight; (5) Finally, Mac Arthur would like to capture Manila  to make it a symbol of his promised “return.”

        On the Japanese side, however, the group composed of sailors, marines and navies commanded by Rear Admiral Sanji Iwabuchi opted to stay and defend Manila to the bitter end because he thought of the city as an impregnable fortress due to its superb ports and the city was surrounded by valuable airfields.  Secondly, the Japanese troops left in Manila were eventually encircled by the American troops leaving them no way for escape.  The situation forced them to fight to their deaths and prompted them to use the civilian population of the city as hostages and prey for their brutalities.

Confusion in Command

       Both the Americans and Japanese Forces encountered a problem of perplexity, which resulted from professional rivalry.  Gen. Douglas Mac Arthur planned in advance that Manila should be secured and the internees of Santo Tomas University be freed alive after the American intelligence unit received an intelligence report from Filipino guerilla units that the Japanese were planning to massacre the internees on the 4th of February, 1945.  But apart from this, Mac Arthur also thought that the capture of Manila would be the best event which can symbolize his “return.”  As a proof to this, Mac Arthur has planned his victory parade even before the city was secured.

       When Mac Arthur ordered to Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger of the 6th Army to defend and secure Manila, Krueger was hesitant and he was the one of the army officers who realized that Manila was a false “center of gravity” and therefore, could be bypassed.  Krueger had qualms in following Mac Arthur’s order because he feared that his men would be potentially vulnerable to Japanese counter attacks if they would immediately move from the north to Manila.  Apart from this instance, another American officer in the person of Lt. Gen. Robert Eichelberger of the 8th Army seemed to compete with Krueger when he ordered to the 11th Airborne Division to advance in Manila from the shores of Nasugbu.  He wanted Manila to be defended, but he had his own reason – he wanted the elements of the 8th Army to stand out and he wanted to show his superiority to Krueger.

       Yamashita was executed after the war trial, but it must be also cleared that it is not only him to be blame with regards to the failure of the Japanese troops to declare Manila an “Open City” and vacate the area at once.  Gen. Tomoyuki Yamashita came in Manila on September of 1944 to take command of the 14th Area Army, however, he found out that the complex command of authority was too complex and his authority was restricted.  It must be noted that Yamashita never enjoyed full rights of command over the troops involved. Furthermore, it was not the intention of Yamashita to defend manila because doing that would be futile on the grounds that: (1) The city has a million of civilian population and the Japanese cannot provide food for them; (2) There were numerous buildings, houses and stores in the city which were highly flammable; and    (3) Manila is a flat land and it requires tremendous strength to defend it.  Rear Admiral Iwabuchi, on the other hand, believed otherwise.  When Yamashita ordered the troops to withdraw and leave Manila, Iwabuchi ordered his men, particularly the marines and the navies to stay and defend the city.  Some Japanese troops escaped and joined Yamashita’s group and some who opposed Iwabuchi were sentenced to death.  With such scenario, it was assumed by many analysts and historians that there could be an existing odd or perhaps unhealthy competition between the Japanese Army and Navy.  Furthermore, some writers would attribute Iwabuchi’s decision to the fact that he wanted to make up for his losses particularly in Guadalcanal.

       Going back to Yamashita, what he actually wanted was: (1) Force the Americans to fight long drawn-out campaigns that would be costly and time consuming causing them to delay assaults on the Japanese; and (2) He wanted his men to be relocated to Baguio and delay actions in the mountains.  Yamashita’s ultimate blunder was when he failed to declare Manila as an “open city” which made the battle even more horrific.

The Battle for Manila Begins

       The battle for Manila was marked by a race between the 37th Infantry Division headed by Maj. Gen Robert Beightler and the 1st Cavalry Division consisted of three flying divisions headed by Brigadier General William Chase.  On February 3, 1945 the cavalrymen reached Grace Park Caloocan, far earlier than the infantrymen.  The seizure of the Malacanan Palace was not that difficult for the cavalrymen, after which, guided by the guerillas in Manila, one of which was Capt. Manuel Colayco, they were able to reach the gates of the University of Santo Tomas.  Meanwhile, the 11th Airborne in the leadership of Maj. Gen Joe Swing approached from the South.  This unit encountered a fight in Imus, Cavite and in Las Pinas, however, there was an interruption in Paranaque because the bridge was totally wrecked.

       That same day, about 3, 500 UST internees were freed.  Few Japanese soldiers retreated to the Education Building and tried to negotiate with the Americans, however, the leader Lt. Abiko who was known for his cruelty was shot in the stomach and died a slow death.  Two days after, the group of Gen. Hayashi negotiated for their escape in exchange of the hostages inside the Education Building.  The Americans agreed and the Japanese went towards Aviles Street.  Unfortunately, the Japanese troops as well as Gen. Hayashi were unaware of the tactical changes in the city, the area that they headed were strong military position of the Americans, most of them were killed in exchange of fires.  The cavalry moved forward but met a stiff resistance in the area near Far Eastern University.  Thanks to the help of the guerillas, the Americans were able to safely return to UST.

       The 37th Infantry Division  reached the Old Bilibid Prisons on the 4th of February.  The next day, they were able to liberate 800 Allied prisoners of war and 530 civilian internees.  Eventually, these internees were moved to Grace Park in Caloocan.  The next day, Mac Arthur  committed a bluff by making an announcement that Manila was liberated at 6:30 in the morning at that day.  When this came the knowledge of President Roosevelt, he made an announcement that the people of America were rejoicing his success.  On the same day, the Japanese penetrated the New Manila district, where the French Consul during that time was murdered.

     On February 7, the 1st cavalry cleaned out the eastern part of the city while the Japanese reached Paco and massacred the people they encountered.  The succeeding days were marked by growing atrocities on the part of the Japanese troops and continuous take-over by the Americans to Japanese military positions.  On the 12th of February,  the Manila navy Defense Force was totally encircled forcing their leader—Lt. Gen. Iwabuchi to order his soldiers to fight to the bitter end and employ mass killings of civilians.  From February 9 to 13, women and young ladies from Ermita were abducted and brought to Bayview Hotel, Alhambra and Peralta Apartments where they were abused and raped.

       Finally on February 17, the Spanish wall of Intramuros in the east was bombed and it was followed by artillery fires until the 23rd.  Three thousand women and children were eventually freed by the Japanese, unfortunately, only few males were able to survived after the Japanese “zoned” the males and brought them to Intramuros where they were massacred.  The succeeding days were marked by the clearing of Manila City Hall, Finance Building and the Legislature.  In doing so, Americans came from the Northern bank of Pasig in the  vicinity of Central Post Office, San Marcelino Street and Padre Faura.

       On March 3, 1945, all military positions of the enemy were cleared and at last, the battle was over.

“No Way to Escape, Fight to the Bitter End”

      As the tide of the battle continued, the American troops and Filipino guerillas were able to obliterate Japanese strong footholds and military positions.  Eventually, Iwabuchi realized that the Americans already encircled the area and there is no more hope of being reunited with the Kembu and Shobu group. This was the mistake of the Americans as according to the teaching of Chinese philosopher Chun Tzu, “Leave a way of escape to a surrounded enemy…” However, the Americans failed to give way of escape to fanatical Japanese soldiers that forced them to fight to the bitter end and to commit atrocities against the civilian population.

      The initial step of the Japanese marines in launching their campaign of terror was the burning of houses, stores and buildings particularly in the areas of Tondo and Binondo.  They were also ordered by Iwabuchi to massacre the civilians – which were done in the worst manner.  Women, especially the young were dragged to places called joro houses where they were abused and raped.  Some hospitals, religious institutions as well as the Red Cross were not exempted from atrocities, massacre and looting.  The Japanese also murdered even foreigners from neutral countries.  Expatriates from Germany, France and Spain did not escape the bloodthirsty Japanese troops.  All in all, the atrocities committed against the civilians—Filipinos and foreigners– were unbearable and cannot be easily forgiven.

Conclusion:

      The catastrophic battle resulted to serious damages.  Approximately 100, 000 civilians died and 50,000 were hurt and wounded.  On the American side, 1,010 soldiers from different units died while 5,565 were wounded giving a total of 6, 575 casualties.  As for the Japanese casualties, it was recorded that about 16,000 soldiers died during the battle.

       In every war, nobody emerges to be the winner.  More than sixty years ago, Manila was liberated, but the pain imprinted on the hearts of the survivors, the relatives and the witnesses to the heartbreaking event will definitely remain.  Forgiveness could have been granted by some, would be granted by few in the near future but definitely forgetting is impossible.  Sometimes, it is really hard to understand why some men could act worse than beasts, but maybe there were reasons…